Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80R01720R900800060019-4 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General Brent Scowcroft, USAF Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs SUBJECT: 1. Your memorandum of 21 March asking that we pass the message to Hanoi that we expect the NVA to leave Laos and Cambodia in accordance with Article 20 of the Paris Agreement arrived too late for inclusion to convince the Hanoi leadership that the U.S. Government will not tolerate continued massive ceasefire violations by the Communists. As you will see in our memorandum of 21 March to Dr. Kissinger, 2. In the meantime, it would appear that your initial request has been overtaken by events, specifically, by President Nixon's own warning on Laos and Cambodia in his statement of 29 March, reinforced by his statement at San Clemente on 3 April. That this warning has reached its target audience is made manifestly clear in a remarkably objective and informative Nhan Dan commentary of 31 March, subsequently carried over Radio Hanoi in Vietnamese, which stated, inter alia:	
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Mr. Nixon declared that the United States has	
been and will continue to comply with the agreement.	25X
He also asserted that a number of provisions in the	

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agreement, such as those concerning an accounting for all missing in action, those with regard to Laos and Cambodia, and those prohibiting infiltration from North Vietnam into South Vietnam have not been complied with. Mr. Nixon threatened the Vietnamese people that they should not have any doubts as to the consequences if they fail to comply with the agreement...

James R. Schlesinger Director

Signature Recommended:

Deputy Director for Operations

Date

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